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Postmodernity 
Marcus Pound 
 
Perhaps nowhere has philosophical reflection on modernity, its failure, and what lies beyond, 
been so keenly observed than in Nietzsche’s ‘How the Real World became a Myth: the 
History of an Error’ (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 20). The error in question is metaphysics as it 
pertains to the distinction between the real world (i.e. the super-sensible world of Ideas) and 
the apparent world (i.e. our contingent material world). The ensuing history charts in six easy 
steps the shifting dynamic of that distinction. Beginning with Plato, the real world is 
understood to be attainable in this life, but only to those to whom knowledge has been 
imparted.  With the birth of Christianity – the second step – the real world (i.e. heaven) 
becomes attainable to all, but deferred: it is achieved only in the after-life and on the basis of 
penance. We enter the third stage with Kant, where the real world slips even further out of 
conceptual grasp. Kant’s scepticism renders the real (i.e. noumena) indemonstrable, and 
heaven a mere postulate of practical reason, something that at best can be posited by way of 
obliging us to act morally, but unknowable nonetheless. The fifth stage appears with the birth 
of positivism; i.e. the attempt to build a picture of the world purely on the basis of what we 
can empirically verify. With positivism, the real world looses all moral force and quickly 
translates into the fifth stage: nihilism; the real world is now no longer good for anything. 
What remains then asks Nietzsche? ‘The apparent world perhaps? But no! With the true 
world we also have abolished the apparent one’ (Nietzsche, 2007, p 20).   
In short, to loose the metaphysical as it pertains to the distinction real/apparent, is to 
loose the meaningfulness of the very distinction, thereby unmooring representation and 
leaving our attempts to account for the world adrift, neither reducible to materialism or 
idealism: the postmodern. 
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Postmodernism appears to present something of a double-bind for theology. On the 
one hand, when we loose the distinction real/apparent, we also loose something of the 
positivist basis upon which religion has traditionally been critiqued. It cannot be the case of 
clearing away the cobwebs of superstition to reveal the apparent world of the ‘purely human’ 
(Milbank, 2006, p. 9); when the ‘purely human’ looses its status as apparent the secular 
narrative descends into just that: a narrative, a fable, a myth; one more competing myth 
amongst myths. Hence, as Zygmunt Bauman suggests, following the ‘protracted and earnest 
[…] struggle to dis-enchant’ the world, postmodernity seems to induce a ‘re-enchantment of 
the word’ (Bauman, 1993, p.  33).   
On the other hand, the ‘wager of representation’ – that a sign refers to a depth of 
meaning guaranteed by God – no longer stands: God too appears as nothing more than a sign 
amongst signs and the whole system becomes weightless (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 10).   
In what follows I want to suggest that this double-bind is highly characteristic of 
postmodern philosophy, highlighting its form within the work of two postmodern thinkers: 
Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou; the former, an Algerian Jew educated in France, whose 
practice of deconstruction was designed to resist the metaphysical absolutes of modernist 
thought through an appeal to the semiotic play of language and an ethical awareness of 
Otherness; the latter, a French atheist whose work explores the procedural conditions by 
which a universal truth is arrived at.  Derrida is a thinker of difference against the background 
of sameness; Badiou is a thinker of sameness within the conditions of multiplicity.    
In both cases particular attention will be given to their handling of reason and faith as 
a means for further theological reflection. My argument however is that while the postmodern 
represented here has provided the condition for the return of religion, what returns is stripped 
of its collective and institutional framework. In short, they collude with the modern suspicion 
of institutional religion and hence the possibility that religion is anything other than a 
 3 
subjective faith.  To this extent postmodern philosophy is shown to be a deepening of modern 
liberal tendencies, unable to represent the plurality it appears to herald.   
By way of introduction I turn briefly to Jean-François Lyotard, who brought the term 
‘postmodern’ into common parlance, and Martin Heidegger, the German phenomenologist of 
Being whose ‘destrukion’ of metaphysics and differential ontology serves as the genealogical 
basis for much of postmodern philosophy. 
 
Lyotard: Incredulity towards meta-narratives 
 
When it came to reflect upon discontent with the political project of emancipation that 
characterised modernity, ‘the postmodern condition’ was not Lyotard’s first choice of 
terminology. Rather, he spoke of ‘lessons in paganism’ (Lyotard, 1989). In the same way the 
pagan’s believed in many gods as opposed to one God, Lyotard wanted to emphasis the 
multiplicity and plurality of narratives, events, and judgments, over and against a single 
coherent trajectory. Lyotard abandoned the term paganism for the ‘postmodern condition’ to 
highlight critical reflection on modernity.  
Simplify put, the postmodern condition is one of ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’ 
(Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). Incredulity toward meta-narratives does not imply incredulity 
toward narrative per se; rather, Lyotard’s concern is the way knowledge is legitimised 
through recourse to a single overarching narrative ‘such as the dialectics of Spirit, the 
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation 
of wealth’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiii). This, according to Lyotard, is what constitutes the 
‘modern’. 
Lyotard gives cultural expression to one of the key elements of postmodern thought: 
multiplicity. Against the ‘One’ of modernity (one nation, one people, etc.) he views the shape 
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of postmodernity to be constituted by the recognition of multiple voices. To put it in 
Nietzsche’s terms, when we loose the real of modernity we are left not with a single apparent 
world, but the sheer multiplicity of competing narratives.   
 
Heidegger: The genealogical root of postmodern philosophy 
 
Lyotard’s cultural observation finds a correlative voice in the philosophical critique of 
metaphysics developed by Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, metaphysics is onto-theology. 
What is at stake in onto-theology is firstly the question of being; i.e. that which can be 
univocally predicated of all beings; and secondly, being’s conflation with the ‘highest Being’: 
God, the causa sui which sustains beings as a whole. As the ground of being, Being gives 
beings their ‘actual prescencing’, serving as the ‘transcendental making possible of the 
objectivity of objects, as the dialectical mediation of the movement of absolute Spirit [Hegel], 
as the historical process of production [Marx], as the will to power [Nietzsche]. (Heidegger, 
1986, pp. 242-243). In short, for Heidegger philosophy has been shaped by a ‘Metaphysical 
concern with identity as wholeness, and Being as the ground of that identity’ (Ward, 1997, p. 
xxxi).  And the history of Western philosophy is the history of repeated attempts to channel 
‘comprehension of the world (finitude) or of religion (God/infinity) through the presupposed 
and existing supremacy of the horizon of Being and its referential benchmark for ‘thought, 
reason and knowledge’ (McCaffrey, 2009, p. 114). 
Heidegger set philosophy on a path of destruktion (Heidegger, 1962, p. 44). 
Destruckion is not simply a negative term; it implies a loosening up of the ontological 
tradition, the attempt to think Being and hence identity as difference, and in this way, think 
that which has been left unthought and concealed by metaphysics (Heidegger, 1969, p. 65).  
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In this way, Heidegger moved philosophy beyond its primary concern with epistemology 
ontology. 
 
Derrida: The destruktion of modernity 
 
Heidegger’s thought provides the groundwork for Derrida and one of the most striking 
philosophical movements to be identified with postmodernity: deconstruction. Derrida shares 
Heidegger’s view that the Western philosophical tradition has been characterised by onto-
theology which defines being in terms of presence (Derrida, 1981, pp. 9-10). An object is 
only to the extent it is presentable or self-present to-itself – and this includes consciousness. 
Deconstruction ‘interrogates’ the ‘determination of Being as presence or as beingness’ 
(Derrida, 1986, p. 413).  
The novelty of Derrida’s approach lay in his reception of Heidegger within the 
context of structuralism. Structuralism was given shape by Ferdinand de Saussure’s defining 
analysis of signs which treated language and culture in terms of a self-contained system of 
signs as distinct from their reference to a given reality.  Language is a system, and meaning is 
generated by virtue of a sign’s oppositional relation/difference to other signs within that 
structure as whole (Saussure, 1986). Derrida’s approach was to show how ‘the place of 
language in the philosophical systems of the West (from Plato to Hegel) functions as a micro-
cosmic crystallisation of larger metaphysical assumptions’ (Smith, 2005, p. 17; See also 
Derrida, 2005, p. 353).  
While the implications of structuralism decentre the subject (i.e. the subject is not 
given in-itself but by virtue of its relation within a persistent structure), Derrida argued that 
the very concept of ‘structure’ smuggled back in certain onto-theological presupposition. 
Structures are organised around a centre which secures the structure as whole, whilst 
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remaining unaffected by the structure. The centre thereby ‘closes off the play which it opens 
up and makes possible’ (Derrida, 2005, p. 352).  The centre, whilst variously defined, be it 
‘arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), aletheia [truth], 
transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so forth’ is nonetheless 
‘always designated the constant of a presence’ (Derrida, 2005, p. 353). This is the 
metaphysical assumption at the heart of structuralism.     
One way to understand Derrida’s relation to structuralism is in terms of the relation of 
postmodernity to modernity offered by Lyotard. Derrida’s work serves to address the way 
modern linguistics implicitly falls back upon a master signifier to legitimise its practice.  
Hence, while Derrida shares many of the insights of structuralism such as the relational 
structure of meaning, Derrida is often situated under the banner of post-structuralism.   
Derrida’s early work took to task the privilege of speech over writing as the 
fundamental conceit of western metaphysics.  From Plato onwards, the philosophical 
tradition has consistently devalued writing in favour of speech as the site of truth (i.e. 
presence). Speaking is somehow viewed as more immediate to consciousness and therefore 
closer to the truth; writing is mediation, thereby threatening the unity of self-presence.  
Making the voice the site of presence shields it from interpretation, and renders knowledge a 
mater of recalling presence (Derrida, 1976, p. 8; Smith, 2005, p. 39). 
Derrida refers to this metaphysical assumption in terms of logocentrism, recalling the 
Greek assumption that Logos related immediately to meaning (Derrida, 1976, p. 11) – part of 
the wider philosophical attempt to shift the object of knowledge (i.e. truth) out the contingent 
and material world and into the realm of ideas.   
Yet as Kevin Hart explains, Derrida’s conclusions upset the metaphysics of presence, 
affirming instead the ‘non-coincidence’ of meaning and being through the critical 
deployment of différance (Hart, 1997, p. 161).   
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‘Différance [with an ‘a’] is neither a word nor a concept’ (Derrida, 1986, p. 400).  The 
French verb differre has one of two meanings – identified in the English by two separate 
words: the action of putting off (i.e. to defer), and in this sense to temporalize; and to be non-
identical, to be Other (i.e. differ).  Derrida’s neologism makes up for this semantic deficiency 
in the French: différance can refer simultaneously to the entire configuration of its meaning; 
it is immediately and irreducibly ‘polysemic’ (Derrida, 1986, p. 401).  
The deployment of différance ‘precedes all grounds, while resisting becoming another 
ground precisely because it forbids self-identity’ (Hart, 1997: 161). To explore différance 
within a text is, not unlike Lyotard, to raise the question regarding the legitimacy of the 
master-signifier, and it does this by discerning precisely the ‘trace’ (i.e. the very mark of an 
absence) within a given text. 
The thrust of Derrida’s appropriation of Heidegger is ethical: violence is the result of 
absolute truth claims; i.e. a claim underwritten by presence. By contrast, a differential 
ontology highlights being’s relation to an Other, and the process of deconstruction is 
precisely that: to unconceal the Other in its Otherness.   
 
Derrida and a/Theology 
 
It is not difficult to view Derrida’s critique in the manner of negative theology.   Derrida’s 
concern for différance, discontinuity, and multiplicity displays an unrequited spirit, 
suspicious of the positive predications which were traditionally secured within metaphysical 
presuppositions. Yet Derrida is preceded by a classical tradition which includes the likes of 
Aquinas, the Divine Names of Dionysius, and Meister Eckhart.  Negative or apothatic 
theology attempts to describe God on the basis of articulating what he is not instead of what 
he is, because as finite creatures we cannot recognise God’s attributes in any real sense: God 
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is beyond what we can positively predicate of him. As Derrida puts it: ‘Negative theology has 
come to designate a certain typical attitude toward language, and within it, in the act of 
definition or attribution, an attitude towards semantic or conceptual determination’ (Derrida, 
1992, p. 74).    
Yet Derrida resists a strict correlation: Différance ‘is not theological’ (Derrida, 1986, 
p. 400); it is irreducible to any ‘theological’ re-appropriation (Derrida, 1982, p. 6).  The 
problem with negative theology is simply that it is not negative enough.  Negative theology 
remains a discourse of the hyper-essential, a ‘wager on onto-theological comprehension’ 
(Coward & Foshay, 1992, p. 4) because any denial is still in service of a deeper affirmation of 
what remains ‘proper’ to God.  In other words, negative theology is still reducible to positive 
theology (Rubenstein, 2003, p, 391) whereas deconstruction ‘blocks every relationship to 
theology’ (Derrida, 1981, p. 40).   
Despite this, Derrida recognises a certain ‘family resemblance’ based upon the notion 
of ‘faith’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 74). By ‘faith’, Derrida is not implying a certainty of belief in a 
determinate religious proposition.  Rather, faith concerns a commitment to the process in 
which a space of un-decidability is opened up.  In other words, the decision of faith for 
Derrida is precisely the decision for uncertainty.  
 
Derrida and Levinas: The ethics of deconstruction 
 
To clarify the above, Derrida’s writings on both Emmanuel Levinas and Marxism are 
instructive.  Much of the ethical thrust of Derrida’s work has been developed in admiration 
for the work of Levinas.  As Derrida suggest: ‘the thought of différance implies the entire 
critique of classical ontology undertaken by Levinas’ (Derrida 1986, p. 413).   
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According to Levinas, moral reasoning tends to assume the knowing self-present 
subject who, in his or her relation to an Other, tends to diminish their distance, reducing the 
Other to sameness on the side of the subject.  Kant’s categorical imperative can be easily read 
in this manner to the extent it compels the individual to judge his action on the basis on others 
making the same judgements – universalising the particular. For Levinas by contrast ethics is 
not about deploying a universal judgement any more than moral consciousness is about a 
given set of values. Rather, ethics is a critical enterprise which arises through an encounter 
with the ‘face’ [visage] of an Other.   
Why the face?  Because, speaking phenomenologically, the face, unlike other objects, 
shines with an irreducible ‘alterity’ [altérité] which calls us to responsibility. As Simon 
Critchley’s succinct summary puts it:  
 
For Levinas, then, the ethical relation – and ethics is simply and entirely the event of 
this relation – is one in which I am related to the face of the Other […] the other 
human being whom I cannot evade, comprehend, or kill and before whom I am called 
to justice, to justify myself. (Critchley 1999, p. 5)         
 
While Derrida’s account of différance overlaps with Levinas, Derrida nonetheless 
discerns a central problematic: given our infinite responsibility to the face of the Other, how 
do we adjudicate between competing obligations?  In other words, what happens when there 
is another face – a ‘third’ triangulating the initial relation?  For Derrida, the imposition of a 
‘third’ serves to protect against the overwhelming responsibility to the face of the initial 
Other, and introduces properly the realm of politics (Derrida, 1997, p. 31). 
What remains then of ethics?  Derrida’s response is not to seek some mediation 
between the two, but to radicalise the split; i.e. our task is to live in the tension between our 
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divided responsibilities, to be continually haunted by the relation to a ‘third’ and in this way 
resist the closure of ethical responsibility.   
 
Religion without Religion 
 
Like many of his generation, Derrida remained deeply influenced by a certain ‘spirit in 
Marxism’ which he was unable to renounce: ‘it is not only the critical idea or questioning 
stance […].  It is even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation’ (Derrida, 
1994, p. 89). 
Faith becomes in Derrida’s oeuvre both a critical venture, and a desire for a type of 
justice, a ‘waiting without a horizon of determinate expectation’ (Caputo, 1997, p. 135); a 
passion for the impossible.  And because faith believes beyond the structures of determinate 
expectations, it is a faith that ‘pushes us beyond the sphere of the same’ (Caputo 1997, 133).  
So while Derrida initially blocks the relation of theology, it is not long before he confess his 
own ‘religion without religion’, inaugurated through the spirit of faith and the promise of 
justice bereft of determinate and institutionalised form.   
 
Derrida: Faith and reason 
 
The opened ended nature of interpretation offered by Derrida might suggest that 
deconstruction entertains a faith devoid of reason.  Yet this is not his aim.  Instead, faith 
belongs to a critical experience which encourages an open disposition, an experience of a 
future which is necessarily indeterminate, ‘desert like […] given up to its waiting for the 
other and for the event’ (Derrida, 1994, p. 90).  And ‘the chance of this desert […] is to 
uproot the tradition which bears it, to atheologize it; without denying faith, this abstraction 
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frees a universal rationality and a political democracy which is indissociable from it’ (Caputo, 
1997, p. 156).  In other words, deconstruction is not so much against reason, as the calculable 
and determinate form reason is given when underpinned by onto-theological considerations.  
In this way, as Smith puts it, Derrida restores the ‘honour of reason’ linking it to ‘an 
obligation being has with the Other’ (Smith, 2005, 86).    
 
Kantian Suspicions 
 
While Derrida shows the importance of faith to reason, he nonetheless maintains an 
opposition between faith and determinate religion. What of religion that returns in this world 
is not the institutional practice which given form to faith, but a faith devoid of metaphysical 
import.  This has an important bearing when viewed in terms of the wider debate on political 
liberalism within postmodernity. 
 Liberalism in the West, for reasons to be explained, while seeking to accommodate 
plural viewpoints, has often been seen to work against such inclusion when it comes to 
religion.  The argument goes something like this: modernity is intimately related to: a) the 
rise of secularism, by which is meant the loss of institutional religious forms, and b) the 
exercise of autonomous rationality.   
 The latter finds expression in Immanuel Kant’s attempts to clarify the nature of the 
Enlightenment: ‘Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage.  Tutelage is 
man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another’ (Kant 1995 
p. 1).  Where man, according to Kant, had previously lacked the basis for self-direction, a 
new found confidence in his rational powers now brought with it the promise of social 
emancipation.  And this was given decisive political expression in the West with the doctrine 
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of liberalism: equality before the law; subjects are treated as equals, which is to treat them 
individually.  
 Yet liberalism is further underlined by a division between the public and the private 
sphere. The public realm assumes a neutral quality, thereby legislating for the freedom to 
adopt critical rationality in the public realm; by contrast, it is in the private realm that the 
subject may adopt an uncritical religious belief or doctrine as he or she sees fit. In short, the 
loss of institutional religion in the public sphere is compensated for by its award in the 
private. Again, this is given expression in the work of Kant who argues:  
 
The use, therefore, which an appointed teacher makes of his reason before his 
congregation is merely private, because the congregation is only a domestic one (even 
if it be a large gathering); with respect to it, as a priest, he is not free, nor can he be 
free, because he carries out the orders of another.  But as a scholar, whose writings 
speak to his public, the world, the clergyman in the public use of his own reason 
enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person. 
(Kant, 1995, p. 4) 
   
 In this way liberal democracy has become synonymous with a secularising impulse in 
which the social role of religion becomes increasingly diminished by relocating religion 
within the private interior, thereby replicating the spilt between reason and faith in terms of 
the public and private.  The believer is, ‘quarantined’, her affinity with a religious community 
compromised, and the ‘transmission of a collective religious heritage’ obstructed (McCaffery 
2009, p. 33).  
 The antinomy not to be missed here is that where postmodern philosophy has 
increasingly moved to decentre the individual through différance, liberalism has increasing 
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pushed in the opposite way, shoring up the subject in a rights-based theory: religious 
expression is less about a critical enquiry as saying something pre-determined and fixed 
about one’s identity.  However, what unites these two approaches is that in both cases, the 
return of religion is made without reference to institutional forms.  Hence Derrida’s ‘religion 
without religion’ begins to sound suspiciously like the new-ageism ‘I am spiritual, not 
religious’.  In other words, the debate may be less about the distinction between a fixed or 
unfixed identity, as the secular reasoning which allows the inner complicity between two 
mutually opposing views. 
 
Badiou: The ‘Act’ of faith 
 
At the other end of our postmodern spectrum is the work of Badiou.  Badiou’s work 
addresses, in true revolutionary fashion, the question of an ‘act’ which breaks the bonds of 
ideological interpellation. Like Derrida, Badiou is a thinker of difference: Being is irreducibly 
multiple, not transcendent but finite.  However, he frames his question not in the usual 
postmodern fashion (i.e. how to exercise contingencies against modernity’s absolutes?), 
instead: given the prior multiplicity of Being, how does a universal truth arise in the first 
place?  
Much of Badiou’s work takes its conceptual direction from mathematics, but it is to St 
Paul he turns when fleshing out a working model for the concerns. The key lies in Badiou’s 
approach which theorises a procedural account of the ‘event’ of truth. ‘Truth’ in this context 
does not concern the adequation between knowledge and its object; it is the process itself that 
matters. At the heart of a truth procedure is an ‘event’ or trauma, an unpredictable encounter 
which breaks with the existing situation thereby escaping conventional representation. As 
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such, an event is neither calculable nor demonstrable by terms outside of the event; it rests 
not on an eternal ground, but the mere fact of its occurrence.   
In St Paul, it is the declarative power of Christ’s resurrection which constitutes the 
event, throwing up a gap of uncertainty which, according to Badiou, could not be 
accommodated by existing Jewish and Greek thought. And it is this uncertainty upon which a 
subject must rest a conviction, henceforth declaring his or her faith in the event.   
In the act of faith the subject gives continuity to the event and becomes a subject as 
such. That is to say, the subject is a subject only to the extent he or she maintains fidelity to 
the event.  The subject does not pre-exist the event, indeed, it is precisely the ‘extrinsic 
conditions’ of a subject’s existence or ‘identity’ that Badiou counters (Badiou, 2003, p. 14); 
rather, it is what the subject says that founds the singularity of the subject’ (Badiou, 2003, p. 
53). 
Post-event, the process of truth becomes one of infinite verification, a constant 
examination within the situation of the consequences of the wager upon which the event was 
decided such that the subject (what Badiou refers to as an ‘apostle’) persists in that Truth.  
Hence Christianity is not deemed true to the extent it conforms to external or transcendental 
criteria (i.e., there really is a God?), but whether its participants maintain fidelity to the event 
of the resurrection in such a way as to organises a new field of experience. 
The subtitle of Badiou’s book on St Paul is “The Foundation of Universalism”:  
  
Something is universal if it is something that is beyond established differences. We 
have differences that seem absolutely natural to us. In the context of these differences, 
the sign of a new truth is that these differences become indifferent. So we have an 
absorption of an evident natural difference into something that is beyond that 
difference. (Badiou, 2005, p. 38)  
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‘Indifference’ here is not the dispassionate neutrality of the secular sphere in which 
differences are ‘respected’, ‘tolerated’ or ‘accommodated’, his position is more radical:  
indifference arises because no moral judgement is being offered; the event literally renders 
previous markers irrelevant; they simply cease to manner in the old way. This is the meaning 
of Paul’s claim in Galatians that ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor 
free, there is neither male nor female – for all of you are one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3: 
28).   
What then of difference? ‘The acknowledgement of difference is itself founded on a 
subjective disposition that comes from Paul’s experience of declarative difference in the 
Event of resurrection that differentiated him from others’ (McCaffrey, 2009, p. 220). In other 
words, difference is principally the difference of the event.   
 
Badiou and Ethics: From difference to sameness  
 
The significance of Badiou’s account comes to the fore when set against the postmodern 
ethics of alterity.  In an affront to the postmodern concern for the Other, Badiou states: ‘the 
whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other should be purely and simply 
abandoned’ (Badiou, 2001: p. 25).  What is at stake here can best be put with reference to the 
simple question: what constitutes a political act?  Often, an apparently transgressive act can 
work not so much to challenge an existing situation as reinforce it.  Think for example how 
disregarding road law is often the very mechanism which allows the traffic to run smoothly.   
On Badiou’s reading, Derrida’s ethics of Otherness does not introduce anything new 
into the political field – it merely maintains that liberal differences should be respected in an 
attitude of openness.  For Badiou such positions can only represent particularity, not 
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universality, and thereby contributes to identity politics; i.e. in support of marginalised 
groups who make foundational appeals on the grounds of a given identify or rights such as 
such as gender or religion.   
Hence, where the thrust of Derrida’s critique is shaped by an apophatic openness to 
the Other, Badiou offers a decisionist ethic.  The ethical imperative shifts from observing 
Otherness and uncertainly to making a wager on an uncertain event.  Again, its not that 
Badiou does not value difference, but that the liberal respect of difference does not do justice 
to the qualitative difference set in process by a truth procedure, and hence the real question is 
not how to recognize differences but ‘recognizing the same’ within a field of multiplicity that 
genuinely constitutes a difference (Badiou, 2001, p. 25). 
 
Badiou: Faith and reason 
 
However, the most critical distinction between Badiou and Derrida lies in their respective 
relation to theology: where Derrida evacuates the institutional husk of theology in favour of 
the distilled kernel of justice and faith, Badiou’s claim is that it is precisely the dogmatic 
claims of religion which matter over an against an unmediated kernel. 
On first sight, Badiou’s philosophy appears to vindicate Nietzsche’s prediction: Being 
as event, or to employ Badiou’s term ‘grace’ simply arrives; it is unfathomable, a happening 
to us, and to which the subject must respond.  Hence Badiou readily assigns St Paul’s work 
the status ‘fable’ (Badiou, 2003, p. 4).  However, as Geoffrey Holsclaw highlights, what 
Badiou also does is provide a means of ‘discerning fidelity’ which unites a subjective 
disposition with dogma (Holsclaw, 2010, p. 240), as well as maintaining the centrality of 
history (the event) without succumbing to historicism.  In doing so, Badiou appears to offer 
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Christian theology a path out of its exile between modern rationalism and the postmodern 
fideism of Derrida. 
 
Post-Secularism: Faith and Reason 
 
In sum, both Derrida and Badiou contribute to a re-invigoration of theology.  Derrida appears 
to offer a path beyond the deconstruction of metaphysics, reconstituting faith as a paradoxical 
openness to the Other that maintains a messianic kernel; Badiou makes St Paul productive for 
politics precisely in it’s dogmatic claims; in both cases religion puts the revolution back into 
politics.  Moreover, both highlight the importance of faith to reason: for Derrida it is faith’s 
uncertainty; for Badiou it is the decisionist element of faith.   
What unites these thinkers however is the double-bind: the re-enchantment of 
philosophy at the expense of metaphysics.  Both maintain an opposition between faith and 
determinate religion: Derrida wants a faith void of religion; Badiou wants dogma without 
faith.  What of religion that returns in this world is not the institutional religion which gave 
rise to faith, but a faith not circumscribed by metaphysics. 
   
Postmodern Theology? 
 
Postmodern philosophy has arguably carved out a new space for theological reflection, and a 
revitalizing of theology in its wake.  Yet a problem remains, the forms of its return 
accentuates liberal trends which ensure religion remains privatised, void of institutional 
framing and political import.   
However, as suggested if, à la postmodernism, all claims to truth, including the social 
sciences, are contingent, then the claims of secular social-theory have no right to primacy 
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over the claims of theology: both are founded in mythos, and the difference pertains to which 
one can invokes the imaginative capability to prioritise peaceful differences.  While 
Liberalism is able to accommodate the postmodern subject, the postmodern subject is still 
unable to accommodate religion, merely tolerate it to the extent it remains a private pursuit 
devoid of politics.   
What then of an alternative space in which differences could coincide? To answer this 
we need only return to Heidegger and pose two related questions: first, why accept his 
account of metaphysics and onto-theology in the first place; second: is the association of 
metaphysics with Christianity a given in the way the postmodernists suggest?  
These are the questions posed by Phillip Blond with the suggestion that Heidegger’s 
narrative about the forgetting of Being masks the relational account of being already 
underway within the Christian metaphysical tradition of the middle-ages.  For Blond, ‘an 
account of being as presence, which itself relies upon the forgetting of ontological tradition, 
is not to be found in any properly figured account of the Christian tradition up to Thomas 
Aquinas’ (Blond, 2002, p. 280); rather, ‘it is only the modern epoch which appears to have 
forgotten being’ (Blond, 2002, 282).  
Blond draws on the work of the French Jesuit Henri de Lubac, and John Milbank, 
amongst others to suggest that the metaphysics which Heidegger disdains, has its foundation 
in the theological sundering of nature and super-nature in the late middle-ages, a diremption 
which remained foreign to most patristic and medieval thinkers for whom nature and grace 
were paradoxically intertwined.  Theologians had every good intention in sundering the two.  
To conflate God and nature is to undermine the possibility that creation is a free gift from 
God.  Yet as Milbank argues, it is a short step from here to a full-bloodied secular autonomy 
of the natural realm which can only explain its cause in terms that are immanent to itself 
(Milbank, 2006).  
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 Theology meanwhile is increasingly consigned to the super-natural, of which only 
revelation can secure its status.  The transcendent primary-cause of Greek and Christian 
thought subsequently becomes something to which only immediate intuition or institutional 
authority can directly appeal to; whereas secondary causes (i.e. nature) becomes its own self-
enclosed realm, unable to transcend its condition and hence distinguish between truth and 
illusion (Blond, 2002, p. 282).  The result of this modern separation is a legacy which permits 
only ‘unmediated appeals to the absolute’ or ‘the random desire of elements’ (Blond, 2002, p. 
283).    
On this reading, secularisation is the not so much the result of abandoning theology, 
but results from a specifically theological turn, so to return to this rupture is one means by 
which to begin to sketch an alternative genealogy of metaphysics.  
A similar point, although differently put, can be found in the criticisms of Derrida by 
Oliver Davies and Denys Turner: ‘negative theology resonates positively with a deeply 
rooted trend in contemporary religiosity towards the privatisation and internalisation of 
religion’ (Davies and Turner, 2002, p. 2). Derrida accepts the comparison of his work with 
negative theology only insofar as apophatic theology defers meaning indefinitely and stripped 
of all reference to a transcendent God. Yet negative theology was marked less by the refusal 
of an hyper-essentialzsed God, and more as a corrective to the ‘exuberant excess’ of the 
Divine Names generated through liturgical and biblical interpretation: ‘Being cancelled in 
this way, these are shown not to be ordinary language use at all but speech that is burdened to 
the point of excess: as exhausted as it is full.’ ((Davies and Turner, 2002, p. 3).   
By contrast, Derrida’s denial is limited by the theology it denounces: onto-theology 
who has little bearing on the world, and whose negation merely consigns one to modern 
atheism.   
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It is beyond the scope of this essay to begin to the constructive task, it needs only to 
be said that what Heidegger, Derrida, and Badiou fail to even consider is the medieval 
doctrine of participation: creation is not self-existence but has existence by virtue of God’s 
grace. Creation is real, but not as distinct from God, it is only real to the extent it participates, 
which is to receive itself as gift: the more we participate in God, the more human we become.  
And because this was further shaped by the relations within the Trinity, Christianity was able 
to link first causes with secondary causes in a way which avoided the metaphysical dogma 
attributed to it by Heidegger (Milbank and Oliver, 2009, pp. 13-24).   
My point then is that Heidegger’s ‘forgetfulness of Being under the weight of onto-
theology obfuscates an alternative theological account which resisted precisely that scheme.  
Of course, it cannot be a question of returning to pre-modern narratives, because theology 
must now speak within the conditions of radical immanentism, yet an awareness of 
participatory metaphysics may allow the creative space for a more critical alternative to 
postmodernism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus far I have surveyed two principal postmodern philosophers.  What connects them is 
their post-metaphysical shift.  In the work of Derrida transcendence is turned into a personal 
responsibility for the Other which mediates a wider justice to come; in the work of Badiou, 
the event is articulated on the basis of a dogma.  
In both cases we have a reconfiguration of reason and faith.  Where modernity was 
apt to separate out reason and faith, Derrida uses faith to restore dignity to reason, whilst 
Badiou offers a discernment of the role of faith in establishing the conditions for a universal 
truth.  Both do away with the intelligible rationalism of God, translating our thinking about 
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faith and reason into a renewed awareness of the contingency and the responsibilities of 
world building.  Derrida revises faith as a critical venture against certainty; Badiou revises 
the dogma of resurrection as the basis for universal truth in the postmodern soup of 
particulars. 
Yet at the heart of these philosophies is the passing of institutional religion, and a 
deepening of the lines drawn by modernity between immanence and transcendence, absence 
and presence, the public and private.  So while postmodernism heralds the death of the 
autonomous rational subject, it quickly oscillates to become a revelation-based philosophies, 
only now revelation takes on a purely fideist colouring.  If we are then to move beyond 
postmodernism, might we not exercise incredulity toward the narrative that it offers amongst 
others?  
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